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STOP PUSHING PEOPLE INTO THE POOL: HOW 
OKLAHOMA’S FORCED POOLING LAWS CAN 





Imagine a man trying to sell his car on the open market. One day he gets 
a letter in the mail. It is an offer to buy his car. The man laughs and throws 
away the letter because the price was insultingly low. He soon gets another 
letter in the mail, this time from the state, notifying him that he will be 
forced to sell his car at that low price offered by the buyer. The man thinks 
this must be a joke. He goes to the state and argues that there is no way this 
is a fair price. The man shows examples of several sales of similar cars 
going for double the price. On the other hand, the buyer provides evidence 
of a sale—at the same low price he is offering now—between the buyer and 
the seller’s neighbor. This is the only evidence the state will accept. 
Because of this evidence, the state forces the sale at the low price.  
This scenario makes a mockery of open market transactions. But the 
forced pooling scheme in Oklahoma does the very same thing with oil and 
gas leases. The goal of this paper is to provide an overview of the forced 
pooling laws in Oklahoma and how they can be better. To do this, I will 
begin with some background information on what forced pooling is through 
the rest of Section I. In Section II, I will dive into the statutory scheme that 
                                                                                                             
  I want to thank God, Lyndsay Hajek, Scott and Beth Hajek, Tony Weaver, Professor 
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sets the foundation for the way forced pooling is handled in Oklahoma, 
Texas, and other states. Section III will then explain what happens beyond 
the statutes, particularly discussing the role of the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission (“OCC”). This discussion will be the bulk of this comment as 
it will get into the different ways Oklahoma could improve forced pooling 
by broadening its fair market valuation method. Section IV will summarize 
the issues with Oklahoma’s forced pooling scheme and how Texas avoids 
these issues. Before concluding, Section V will discuss how these changes 
can be made and why they have not.  
A. Spacing Units and Voluntary Poolings 
To understand the idea of forced pooling, it will help to discuss how the 
owner of a natural resource is determined. This has changed from the rule 
of capture to unitization through spacing units. After spacing units are 
created, multiple owners can come together to drill a well in that unit by 
voluntarily pooling their interests. But when those owners cannot come to 
an agreement on their own, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission can 
force the owners to pool their interests so that an oil well can be drilled. 
In the beginning, the rule of capture was the law governing who could 
claim ownership over natural resources. Resources below the ground 
generally belonged to the owner of the land above that resource. But when 
there was a large pool of a resource below two or more different properties, 
the rule of capture determined ownership. Under the rule of capture, the 
first person to extract a resource from the ground had the exclusive 
ownership of that resource.
1
 This led to landowners racing to extract 
resources because whoever got it first was the owner, with the slower 
landowner being left without compensation for any oil under their property 
that was extracted by a neighbor.
2
 This also meant that many landowners 
were drilling into the same pool of resources, leading to over-drilling. For 
example, one pool of oil underground could be large enough to cover 
several different properties owned by several different people. When 
several people try to drill into the same pool of oil, there are two primary 
types of waste that occur: the waste of economic resources and the waste of 
natural resources.
3
 Preventing these sorts of waste and conserving natural 
                                                                                                             
 1. Abby Harder, Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of 
Neighboring Landowners, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/ 
compulsory-pooling-laws-protecting-the-conflicting-rights-of-neighboring-landowners.aspx. 
 2. Id. 
 3. OIL AND GAS LAND REFERENCE VOLUME 78 (Am. Ass’n of Prof’l Landmen ed., 9th 
ed. 2012). 
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resources is a fundamental goal of the statutes establishing the OCC’s 
ability to create spacing units.
4
 
Spacing unit laws came in to supersede and to fix some of the issues that 
rose from the rule of capture. The issues of over-drilling, over-producing, 
and racing to capture are fixed by requiring a spacing unit to be formed 
before a well can be drilled.
5
 Spacing units are areas of approximately 
uniform size and shape that are established by the OCC.
6
 A unit typically 
covers an entire “common source of supply,” which is typically a pool of 
oil or a pocket of natural gas under the earth.
7
 Only one well can be drilled 
on these units,
8
 thereby eliminating the issue of multiple wells being drilled 
to extract out of the same source. This also protects neighboring landowners 
because the OCC will include them in the same unit when their property is 
above the same common source. For example, take two landowners with 
two separate pieces of property, each of them setting on top of one common 
source of oil. Where the rule of capture would have two potential drillers 
and a race to extraction of the source beneath them, the spacing unit statute 
now requires that a single spacing unit be created above that source—with 
both pieces of property being included in that single unit. This ensures that 
both landowners have a fair opportunity to produce their fair share of oil 
and gas in the common source of supply in their spacing unit.
9
 
In a spacing unit with multiple land or other interest owners, who gets to 
drill the well? Depending on who the owners are, there are many ways to 
go about drilling on a spacing unit. If an oil producer and a farmer have 
interests on the same spacing unit, they will likely come to an agreement 
where the oil producer drills the well and compensates the farmer with a 
percentage of the profits from producing the oil in their unit. There are 
many possible scenarios like this with no limit to the number of owners and 
the nature of the arrangements.  
Underlying these arrangements between parties is an agreement to come 
together to drill a well by “pooling” their interests. The spacing unit is what 
allows them to do that. In Oklahoma, the establishment of a spacing unit by 
the OCC is enough to “perfect” the pooling process so that nothing else 
needs to be done, whereas in most other states, the owners would need to 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. 
 5. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021). 
 6. 52 O.S. § 87.1(a), (e) (OSCN 2021). 
 7. Id. at § 87.1(e). 
 8. Id. There are also exceptions to the one well rule. 
 9. AM. ASS’N OF PROF’L LANDMEN, supra note 3, at 80. 
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file for a declaration of a pooled unit.
10
 The establishment of a spacing unit, 
along with an agreement between owners to drill a well on their spacing 
unit is a “voluntary pooling.” But people are not always going to come to 
agreements that easily.  
In any other context, when people cannot come to an agreement, they go 
their separate ways. But in the oil and gas industry, great importance is 
placed on getting those resources out of the ground. It is so important that if 
someone wants to drill a well but cannot come to an agreement with the 
other owners in the spacing unit, they don’t have to give up their hopes of 
producing. They can go to the OCC who has the authority to force the 
“non-consenting” owners (owners who won’t agree to a voluntary pooling) 
to pool their ownership interests to “avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, 
or to protect correlative rights.”
11
 Forced pooling can also be used when the 
owner of one or more pieces of land can’t be found,
12
 but the focus of this 
comment will be on situations where forced pooling is exercised when 
known owners do not agree to pool. 
B. The Forced Pooling Process in Oklahoma 
Forced pooling allows the OCC to pool the interests of parties who have 
not come to an agreement on their own.
13
 When a party is forced to pool, 
the pooling order not only sets the terms for one well site, but it sets the 
terms for the entire spacing unit and any well drilled on it.
14
 However, this 
does not happen automatically. An application must be filed by any owner 
with the right to drill and produce oil and gas in the unit,
15
 such as mineral 
owners, lease holders, and working-interest owners who wish to pool the 
other, non-consenting owners.
16
 The person who files the application is 
typically the party who wishes to oversee the drilling of the well (and be 
responsible for making all the decisions that come with production). To be 
in charge of production, the owner must be deemed the “operator” by the 
pooling order. The operator is typically the owner with the largest share of 
working interest.
17
 A working interest simply means that the owner’s 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 78. 
 11. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021OSCN 2021). 
 12. AM. ASS’N OF PROF’L LANDMEN, supra note 3, at 81. 
 13. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021OSCN 2021). 
 14. Amoco Production Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 1986 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 24, 751 P.2d 
203, 208. 
 15. 52 O.S. § 87.1(i) (OSCN 2021OSCN 2021). 
 16. Id. at § 87.1(e). 
 17. Charles Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in Oklahoma, 
50 OKLA. B.J. 648, 653 (1979). 
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“bundle of sticks” includes the ability to drill a well and produce oil and gas 
on the property.
18
 It often makes sense to allow the majority owner to be the 
operator because the person who has the most “skin in the game” is more 
likely to do things the right way to avoid jeopardizing his investment. 
Another important factor to consider when designating an operator is 
actual, bona fide exploration activity.
19
 This activity must be more than just 
filing the right paperwork before the other owners. There are several 
considerations to help the OCC determine whether the proposed operator 
has actually made an effort to produce. These considerations include 
looking at when the well was first proposed, whether the proposed operator 
has drilled other wells, whether any equipment has been leased out, and so 
on.
20
 This is an important factor because the OCC wants to give the keys to 
the operation to someone who is actually going to follow through and 
produce oil and gas.  
The pooling application must give all owners that the applicants can find 
through due diligence at least fifteen days’ notice. This notice must be by 
mail, by publication in Oklahoma County, and by publication in a 
newspaper in each county where the lands in consideration for pooling are 
located.
21
 After notice and a hearing in front of the OCC, an order may be 
made by the OCC pooling the interests in accord with terms and conditions 
that are reasonable and that allow the owner being forced into the pooling a 
chance to receive their fair share of the oil and gas being extracted.
22
 This 
ability by the OCC to force mineral owners to pool their interests to 
conserve natural resources has been recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court as a valid exercise of state police power.
23
 
II. Statutory Scheme 
A. How Other States Approach Forced Pooling 
Most states in the U.S. have some form of a forced pooling statute (only 
nineteen states have no forced pooling statute whatsoever), but not all states 
create the same outcome for non-consenting owners. The different statutes 
can be distinguished by looking at the consequence imposed on non-
                                                                                                             
 18. 52 O.S. § 570.2(12) (OSCN 2021). 
 19. Nesbitt, supra note 17. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021). 
 23. Anderson v. Corp. Comm’n, 1957 OK 39, ¶ 11, 327 P.2d 699, 702; Wakefield v. 
State of Oklahoma, 1957 OK 10, ¶ 6, 306 P.2d 305, 307. 
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consenting owners. There are three basic categories: the “risk-penalty” 
approach, the “costs-only” approach, and the “options-given” approach.  
The most common approach is the “risk-penalty” approach. This 
approach forces those owners who cannot come to an agreement to 
compensate the producing owners for the risk and cost of production.
24
 The 
justification behind this approach is that if owners don’t participate, they 
will be penalized for making those producing owners bear that risk on their 
own. At first glance this could seem unfair: why should an owner be 
penalized and forced to pay someone for taking a risk when the owner 
wants to play it safe and avoid that risk? But when viewed through a 
conservationist lens, it makes total sense. Most pooling statutes want to 
promote oil and gas exploration, protect the right of owners to drill, and 
prevent waste. By forcing someone to pay a potentially large penalty for not 
participating, the risk-penalty approach not only ensures that these 
objectives will be met, but it also encourages owners to come to a voluntary 
pooling agreement and avoid forced pooling altogether.
25
 
The risk-penalty approach is used by most large oil-producing states. 
Texas, North Dakota, New Mexico, and Colorado—the first, second, third, 
and fifth largest oil producing states in the U.S.
26
 respectively—all have 
some sort of risk-penalty approach in their statutes. In Texas, for example, 
any non-consenting owner who is force-pooled and elects not to pay a 
proportionate share of the costs of operation and production in advance will 
be responsible for reimbursing the producing owner. This reimbursement of 
production costs comes out of the non-consenting owner’s share of 
production revenues. And on top of that, they will pay a fee of up to 100 
percent of their share of the production costs, essentially doubling the price 
they’d have to pay.
27
 North Dakota makes non-consenting owners pay a 
risk penalty of 50-200 percent, depending on whether they have agreed to 
lease their mineral rights.
28
 New Mexico similarly requires non-consenting 
owners to pay their share of production costs plus a risk-penalty of up to 
200 percent of these costs.
29
 Colorado is a bit steeper on the penalty 
imposed to non-consenting owners. These penalties are 100 percent of the 
                                                                                                             
 24. Harder, supra note 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Oklahoma is number 4. Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil 
Comes From, EIA (last updated Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-
and-petroleum-products/where-our-oil-comes-from.php.  
 27. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE § 102.052(a) (2020). 
 28. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 38-08-08(3)(a)-(b) (2020). 
 29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-17(c) (2020). 
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non-consenting owner’s share of the cost of surface equipment and 
operation of the wells, along with 200 percent of the portion of costs and 
expenses for preparation of drilling.
30
 Overall, the risk-penalty approach 
encourages the voluntary pooling by owners because, as noted above, the 
penalties can be more expensive than if they had come to an agreement in 
the first place. This method is, however, more favorable to extraction 
companies as it gives would-be, non-consenting owners almost no choice 
but to come to an agreement with the extracting companies.  
Another approach used by some states (but only one top-ten oil 
producing state—Alaska
31
) is the “costs-only” approach, which requires 
non-consenting owners to be liable only for production costs if the 
extraction is successful.
32
 This is like risk-penalty, without the penalty. The 
non-consenting owner still must pay for production costs, but there is no 
additional penalty for avoiding the risk that the other landowners are taking 
by producing. Alaska also, uniquely, allows for a landowner to drill for just 
their proportional amount of oil and gas on their individual piece of land if 
a voluntary pooling cannot be reached.
33
 
Finally, the third approach—which Oklahoma uses—is called the 
“options-given” approach. Here, non-consenting owners can choose from a 
set list of options that fit their circumstances best, and there is usually an 
automatic option if the non-consenting party does not choose in time.
34
 This 
scheme is said to be the best solution for a free-market approach by 
allowing owners to choose what would best benefit them.
35
 But this 
approach also discourages voluntary pooling because even if they are 
subject to a pooling order, there isn’t a known, mandatory punishment that 
comes with it, like under the risk-penalty approach. Instead, non-consenting 
owners are willing to ride out the pooling order to see what options they 
get. 
B. Oklahoma’s “Options-Given” Approach  
In Oklahoma, someone subject to a pooling order can either lease their 
rights to the applicants or choose to participate in the operation.
36
 Leasing 
their rights to the applicants is typically done in exchange for a royalty, 
                                                                                                             
 30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(7)(b)(I)-(II) (2020). 
 31. ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.100(c) (2020). 
 32. Harder, supra note 1. 
 33. ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.100(e) (2020). 
 34. Harder, supra note 1. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021). 
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which is an agreed upon rate (usually a percentage of the production of the 
well) that an oil company pays a landowner to use their land and minerals. 
Along with a royalty payment, the landowner also usually gets an upfront 
payment, referred to as a “lease bonus,” from the producer. As the royalty 
goes up, the bonus goes down and vice versa. Going this route leases the 
owner’s rights away and avoids participation in exchange for a small fee. 
Participating, in contrast, allows owners to keep their rights, but the costs of 
drilling are split with the producer. Choosing to participate gives owners the 
potential to earn more than they would with only a royalty interest.
37
  
It is important to note that once an option is selected, the owner being 
pooled is stuck with that option.
38
 An owner being pooled is not able to 
choose to lease away their rights and then, after seeing that the production 
is successful, opt in to participate in the other wells on that unit. Even if the 
operator of the unit fails to pay a royalty owner who had leased the operator 
their rights, the owner is now in a debtor-creditor relationship. This failure 
to pay is not justification to retroactively choose to participate in the well.
39
 
Depending on how successful the well is, participation could lead to a 
higher compensation, especially if more wells are drilled. But the statute 
currently forces owners to take a gamble on whether they think any wells in 
the unit will be successful enough to justify participation in the well. To 
avoid the gamble, the ability to lease away rights seems like a fair second 
option. But it will become clear that this option is not always ideal either.
40
  
When looking at the top ten oil-producing states in the United States, 









 uses the “costs-
only” approach, and the other seven states all use the “risk-penalty” 
approach.
45
 Oklahoma is the only one of the top five oil-producing states to 
not use the risk-penalty approach. 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id.  
 38. Amoco, 1986 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 24. 
 39. Buttram Energies, Inc. v. Corp. Comm’n, 1981 OK 59, ¶¶ 5, 7, 629 P.2d 1252, 
1254. 
 40. See infra Section III(C). 
 41. Harder, supra note 1. 
 42. California is the seventh largest oil and gas producing state in the United States. Oil 
and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil Comes From, supra note 30. 
 43. Harder, supra note 1. 
 44. Alaska is the sixth largest. Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil 
Comes From, supra note 30. 
 45. Harder, supra note 1. 
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C. The Scope of Forced Pooling Statutes 
We can look to Texas, the largest oil and gas producing state in the U.S., 
and see how its forced pooling laws promote more voluntary pooling. This 
is not only because it takes a risk-penalty approach,
46
 but also because the 
scope of the statute limits the situations where a forced pooling can occur. 
Oklahoma’s forced pooling scheme is very comprehensive and broad, 
whereas Texas courts and lawmakers are strongly against forced pooling, 
leading to a very limited set of pooling statutes.
47
 These limited statutes—
along with other factors discussed in the next section—are the reason 
Oklahoma oil producers are much more likely to try to force pool. From 
2014 to 2020, the ratio of final pooling orders to completed wells in 
Oklahoma was 55%.
48
 With an average number of pooling orders per year 
in that span being 667, and completed wells being 1,232.
49
 While in Texas, 
the average number of completed wells per year is 13,937.
50
 But while 
Texas has over ten times the amount of completed wells in that span, 
Oklahoma’s pooling orders in 2020 alone were over twice as many as 
Texas has had since 1992.
51
  
Texas enacted its forced pooling law, the Mineral Interest Pooling Act of 
1965 (“MIPA”), to apply in cases where there are small or irregularly 
shaped tracts of land that are not big enough to cover an oil producing unit 
by themselves. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has explained the spirit of 
the law and the intention of the courts and legislature: 
[W]hen spacing patterns were set by the Railroad Commission in 
a field, the owner of a tract smaller than such drilling unit either 
would be denied a permit altogether or would be granted such a 
low allowable that it was not profitable to drill. His oil, then, 
                                                                                                             
 46. The risk-penalty is a harsher result in Texas forced poolings, compared to getting 
options in Oklahoma. See supra Section II(A). 
 47. AM. ASS’N OF PROF’L LANDMEN, supra note 3, at 81. 
 48. Data extracted from https://oklahoma.gov/occ/divisions/oil-gas/oil-gas-data.html, 
and from an Open Records Request for pooling data https://oklahoma.gov/occ/news/open-
records-requests.html.  
 49. Id. 
 50. SUMMARY OF DRILLING PERMITS, COMPLETIONS AND PLUGGING REPORTS 
PROCESSED: 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 2020), see also annual reports 
for 2019, 2016. 
 51. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Oil and Gas Proposals for Decision and Orders: Mineral 
Interest Pooling Act Index, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/hearings/dockets/oil-gas-proposals-
for-decision-and-orders/mineral-interest-pooling-act-index/ (showing a total of 71 orders 
under MIPA with the oldest being from 1992 and the newest from 2020). 
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would be drained away and produced by others. Alternatively, if 
the small tract owner were granted an allowable which permitted 
profitable development of his tract he would drain away his 
neighbor's oil and gas in that he was allowed to produce more oil 
or gas than was in place under his tract. These problems the Act 
was designed to cure by providing a method by which the 
owners of small tracts could be forced to pool their interests into 
a proration unit of the size provided for the field. The owners 
may pool by agreement, but in the absence of their being able to 
agree or unwilling to have their interests pooled, one of their 
number can make application to the Railroad Commission under 
the Act and force the others to pool with him.
52
 
MIPA only applies to reservoirs discovered after March 8, 1961.
53
 This 
already excludes most reservoirs in Texas because most of them were 
discovered before March 8, 1961.
54
 If the reservoir was discovered after 
March 8, 1961, three requirements must be met before pooling can be 
forced: (1) there must be at least two separately owned tracts of land in the 
unit; (2) there must be separately owned interests in the oil and gas, and the 
owners must not have agreed to pool their interests; and (3) at least one of 
the owners must have drilled or have proposed to drill a well on the unit.
55
 
The three elements above are also mentioned in the Oklahoma forced 
pooling statute,
56
 but there is a key difference. Where Texas requires that 
there be at least two separately owned tracts of land and separately owned 
interests, Oklahoma requires at least two separately owned tracts of land or 
separately owned interests.
57
 Imagine a farmer who owns an entire mile 
section of land. Assume he has leases with four different producers with 
each producer leasing a quarter of the section. In Oklahoma, one of the 
producers could file an application and force pool the rest of the owners 
because there are separately owned interests. In Texas, forced pooling in 
                                                                                                             
 52. Superior Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 519 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975), writ refused NRE (June 25, 1975). 
 53. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (2020). 
 54. See History of Oil Discoveries in Texas, TEXAS ALMANAC (last visited Dec. 30, 
2020), https://texasalmanac.com/topics/business/history-oil-discoveries-texas, see also Oil 
Fields in Texas, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Dec. 30, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Category:Oil_fields_in_Texas, see also https://www.beg.utexas.edu/files/publications/cr/ 
CR1983-Galloway-1_QAe6885.pdf. 
 55. NAT. RES. § 102.011. 
 56. 52 O.S. § 87.1(e) (OSCN 2021). 
 57. Id. 
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this scenario is statutorily prohibited because even though there are 
separately owned interests, there is only one owner of the one tract of land.  
This post-1961 discovery requirement, along with the separately owned 
tract requirement, statutorily excludes many would-be pooling applications 
in Texas and is just the first reason why Texas sees more voluntary pooling. 
The next section explores how Texas further limits forced pooling beyond 
the statutes. First, it does a better job of ensuring owners make a bona fide 
attempt to reach an agreement before resorting to forced pooling. Second, it 
is better able to find the true fair market value owed to owners being forced 
to pool. 
III. Enforcement and Application: Hearing, Evidence, 
and Fair Market Value 
Oklahoma’s statutory scheme allows more pooling applications than 
Texas because of the lack of a discovery requirement and because of the 
options-given approach. But even so, this number is still larger than it could 
be because of how the OCC applies these statutes and rules. In this section, 
I will first discuss how the OCC gets its authority and what that authority is. 
Then I will discuss how easy it is to show a bona fide effort to reach a 
voluntary agreement, which is the first reason forced pooling has become 
almost automatic in Oklahoma. Finally, I will discuss why forced pooling 
hearings in Oklahoma don’t accurately assess the fair market values that 
non-consenting owners should be awarded at a pooling hearing. This 
further incentivizes large production companies to make forced pooling 
their default option, making it that much more automatic. 
A. Administrative Law and Who Governs Forced Pooling Hearings 
Forced pooling hearings are handled internally by the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission. Hearings occur in a court setting completely 
within its supervision and jurisdiction, conducted and ruled by an 
Administrative Law Judge under its employ. The Oklahoma Constitution 
created the Corporation Commission in Article 9, Section 15.
58
 Section 18 
of Article 9 allows the Corporation Commission to make its own rules, 
effectively creating a new legislative body, but they are still subject to 
general laws created by the actual legislature of Oklahoma.
59
 The 
Constitution gives the OCC power to create rules over transportation and 
transmission companies. Oklahoma statutes allow the OCC to create an Oil 
                                                                                                             
 58. O.K. CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
 59. O.K. CONST. art. IX, § 18. 
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and Gas Department under its jurisdiction and supervision, thereby 
extending its jurisdiction to reach the oil and gas industry.
60
 The OCC has 
exclusive statutory jurisdiction and the power to create and enforce rules 
regarding the conservation of oil and gas and many other activities 
regarding the exploration, drilling, and production of oil and gas.
61
  
The Oklahoma Constitution gives the OCC power to hold its own court 
proceedings. In these proceedings, the OCC has the authority, like any other 
court in Oklahoma, to administer oaths, compel attendance of witnesses, 
compel production of records, enforce compliance, and give penalties.
62
 
The OCC is authorized by statute to hire Administrative Law Judges who 
will preside over all hearings that take place under its supervision.
63
 
However, the OCC is not a court of general jurisdiction and cannot do 
certain things, like entering money judgments against appellants,
64
 but the 
OCC still has a lot of power in this setting. No other court, besides the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to review, affirm, reverse, or 
remand any OCC ruling.
65
  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that the OCC has broad 
discretion in performing its statutory duties.
66
 There might be a little too 
much discretion in the way it approaches pooling hearings, but 
nevertheless, that means there isn’t much standing in the way of the OCC 
making improvements on its own without having to seek permission. 
B. Bona Fide Effort to Reach an Agreement 
The OCC rules provide each pooling application must show that the 
applicant “exercised due diligence to locate each respondent and that a bona 
fide effort was made to reach an agreement with each such respondent.”
67
 
But what constitutes due diligence and a bona fide effort to come to an 
agreement? Written rules or procedures are lacking in this area, but a 
presentation put together by the OCC provides some insight.
68
 At pooling 
hearings in Oklahoma, the Administrative Law Judge asks about the due 
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diligence that the applicant used to locate the interest owners, which can be 
satisfied with as little as a county records search.
69
 The standard for 
showing a bona fide effort to reach a voluntary agreement is similarly low. 
To show a bona fide effort to reach an agreement in Oklahoma, “some 
oil companies simply mail out a lease proposal and don’t even include a 
copy of the oil and gas lease to review.”
70
 If the owners don’t respond, they 
get put on the pooling application.
71
 In Texas, “a fair and reasonable offer 
to pool voluntarily” must be made by the applicant or the application will 
be dismissed.
72
 These offers must be detailed in the application, and the 
applicant and non-consenting owner must have negotiated seriously.
73
 This 
is unlike Oklahoma, where the applicant can simply send an offer and file 
the application before an offer is even rejected.
74
  
Showing a fair offer and serious negotiations were made in Texas is a 
high bar to overcome. There are several guidelines that keep this bar high to 
encourage voluntary pooling. An offer in Texas must take into 
consideration all the relevant facts that existed at the time of the offer and 
that “would be considered important by a reasonable person in entering into 
a voluntary agreement concerning oil and gas properties.”
75
 The offer must 
also be “fair and reasonable from the standpoint of the party being forced 
pooled.”
76
 Texas Courts will give benefit to the side of the small owners, as 
they are usually the parties being pooled.
77
 Courts do this because of the 
legislative history and intent, which seeks to encourage voluntary pooling.
78
  
Applicants in Texas give themselves the best chance to show a fair offer 
was made if they give owners options or various ways to participate. Offers 
may be deemed unreasonable for many reasons. Some examples would be 
an offer only to participate when the owner likely does not have the capital 
to afford participation, or only offering a fair market value lease to an 
owner who might decline it because they want to develop themselves or 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 8. 
 71. Id. 
 72. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.013(b) (2020). 
 73. Benjamin B. Holliday, Overview of Texas’ Mineral Interest Pooling Act 23 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2021), https://theenergylawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/HELG-
MIPA-FINAL.pdf. 
 74. The Pooling Process in Oklahoma, supra note 68 at 8. 
 75. Carson v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 669 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1984). 
 76. Windsor Gas Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 529 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975), dismissed (Jan. 28, 1976), writ granted (Jan. 28, 1976). 
 77. Holliday, supra note 73 at 27. 
 78. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





 This is because if the applicant only gives the other owner one 
option, that option could be viewed as unreasonable from the side of the 
owner being pooled. 
This requirement in Texas is generally so difficult to overcome that the 
parties often just resort to voluntary pooling. Non-consenting owners 
usually accept fair and reasonable offers because they know that rejecting a 
genuine, “fair and reasonable offer” will likely result in a forced pooling 
under Texas law.
80
 Similarly, because Texas actually enforces this 
requirement, would-be pooling applicants know that they would just be 
wasting their time if they tried to force pool without first truly trying to 
reach an agreement with other owners.  
C. True Market Value and Issues with Evidence 
Beyond showing that efforts were made to reach an agreement, there is 
still the large hurdle of trying to decide what a fair and reasonable offer 
actually is. The requirement of showing that a bona fide effort was made to 
reach an agreement acts as a gatekeeper. That gatekeeper in Oklahoma lets 
in almost any and every attempt to pool, while the gatekeeper in Texas 
stands strong to ensure as much voluntary pooling happens as possible. But 
the real driving force that makes the pooling process in Oklahoma so 
automatic is the lack of a true, fair and reasonable offer being determined at 
the OCC pooling hearings.  
This is not an issue in Texas, because Texas is so stringent about keeping 
applications out unless a fair and reasonable offer was made in the first 
place. This results in forced pooling being the exception in Texas. And 
when it does happen, there won’t be an issue in fair market value because 
of the efforts made to ensure there was a fair offer before the application 
was even considered. In fact, the Texas forced pooling statute has been 
“characterized by scholars as a ‘compulsory voluntary pooling act,’ because 
a force pooling order will not issue unless the applicant has made a strong 
effort to secure pooling voluntarily.”
81
 In this subsection I will begin with a 
bit of background information on leases, which is what the OCC and the 
parties to a pooling order are trying to valuate. I will then discuss the 
evidence that the OCC does and does not allow when determining lease 
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value and why this approach leads to an unfair market value. Finally, I will 
discuss another issue with what the OCC does with some of these values 
once they are determined.  
1. Mineral Leases: The Preferred Option 
The fair and reasonable offer being disputed is usually the fair market 
value of the lease being offered to non-consenting owners. That lease is part 
of Oklahoma’s “options-given” approach: specifically, the option not to 
participate and instead lease rights away. Not only is participation a huge 
gamble, as discussed in the previous section,
82
 but it is also economically 
infeasible for most owners. This is especially true when the pooling 
applicant is a large horizontal drilling company. The costs of horizontal 
drilling, which the owner being pooled would have to pay their share of, are 
very high. These high costs may not make sense to an ordinary landowner, 
who owns the minerals and might not have any experience in oil and gas 
production. But even for a vertical producer, participating does not make 
sense because horizontal wells usually cost anywhere from 1.5-2.5 times as 
much as a vertical well.
83
 For the remainder of this subsection, the focus 
will be on the option to lease rights to the applicants because, for most 
owners being pooled, participation is not a realistic option. 
When pooling applicants try to lease an owner’s rights, they can be 
dealing with the landowner, who owns 100 percent of the mineral rights, or 
they can be dealing with someone who has already secured a lease on those 
rights. In the first scenario, applicants will have to negotiate a lease from 
scratch, where they get a certain working interest, and the mineral owner 
gets a royalty; the two interests together making up the entire 100 percent 
ownership of the mineral rights. The working interest is typically anywhere 
from seventy-five percent to eighty-seven and a half percent, with the 
mineral owner retaining the corresponding remainder as the royalty. For 
example, the producer keeps eighty percent of the profit and the mineral 
owners would get the other twenty percent in exchange for letting the 
producer use their minerals. In the oil and gas industry this would be 
referred to as a 1/5 royalty with a 4/5 working interest. But more often than 
not, especially in large, oil-producing states like Oklahoma, pooling 
applicants are dealing with the second scenario. The pooling applicants are 
trying to lease minerals that have already been leased by someone else. 
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Rather than negotiating a new lease, they are essentially trying to buy the 
lease from the party who currently has it. 
When pooling applicants try to buy a lease from someone else, the party 
on the other end of these negotiations is typically another production 
company. When these producers try to negotiate with another leaseholder, 
neither party has as much room to negotiate. This is because they are not 
working with 100 percent of a mineral interest at this point. The current 
leaseholder likely has already negotiated a deal with the previous mineral 
owner, so they are only working with that current leaseholder’s working 
interest. For example, if a vertical producer secured a mineral interest from 
a landowner with the landowner retaining a 1/8 royalty, the producer now 
only has 7/8 of that mineral interest to bargain with when a horizontal 
production company comes in to try to pool. If a horizontal producer wants 
to pool, they will take over this lease so that they now have a 7/8 working 
interest with the original mineral owner keeping their 1/8 royalty, leaving 
the vertical producer with no interest in the minerals. The vertical producer 
gets compensated for handing over their lease with a per acre
84
 cash bonus 
from the horizontal production company.  
The only way for the vertical producer to retain an interest in the 
minerals would be to negotiate a deal where the horizontal producer 
receives less than what the vertical producer has to offer. For example, if a 
vertical producer has secured an eighty-five percent working interest with 
the original mineral owner retaining a fifteen percent royalty, the vertical 
producer may negotiate a deal where the horizontal producer gets only 
eighty percent. Thus, the horizontal producer would have an eighty percent 
working interest, the original mineral owner would still have their fifteen 
percent royalty, and the vertical producer would keep a five percent 
“overriding” royalty. Other than this scenario, all a pooled vertical producer 
can expect to receive is a cash bonus. This background information will be 
useful when analyzing how leases are valued by the OCC.  
2. Determining Fair Market Value of a Mineral Lease in Oklahoma 
Non-consenting owners who are force pooled in Oklahoma do not get the 
correct market value compensation for their leases. In Oklahoma, the fair 
market value of a force pooled interest is supposed to be “the level at which 
this interest can be sold, on open-market negotiations, by an owner willing, 
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but not obliged, to sell to a buyer willing, but not obliged, to buy.”
85
 This 
seems to be a straight-forward definition, but Oklahoma can do a much 
better job of approaching valuations that resemble open-market 
negotiations.  
When money or cost issues arise between parties in a pooling dispute, 
the OCC “shall determine the proper costs after due notice to interested 
parties and a hearing thereon.”
86
 This is one of its statutory duties, and 
according to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the OCC has broad discretion 
in performing those duties.
87
 Part of performing that duty of determining 
proper costs includes hearing or choosing not to hear evidence with respect 
to the value of a lease during a pooling hearing. 
The evidence considered at the pooling application hearing has been a 
subject for debate. In determining the fair market value of a lease, the 
administrative law judge will consider leases that have been signed within 
the same unit.
88
 For example, consider a unit with five different interest 
owners. A horizontal drilling company has already secured a lease with four 
of the five owners, but the fifth won’t agree. The horizontal company will 
then file an application to force pool the noncompliant owner’s interests. At 
the hearing, the drilling company will use those leases already secured 
within the unit as evidence of a fair market value for the fifth owner. Leases 
will also be considered outside of the specific unit, but the OCC has limited 
this to leases made only in the nine surrounding sections.
89
 Along with 
limits on geographical distance, there is also a limit on distance in time, 
with leases negotiated more than one year prior to the hearing not being 
allowed into evidence.
90
 Only actual leases, not offers, are allowed as 
evidence, and only arm’s length transactions are considered, excluding 
State or Indian leases.
91
  
Horizontal drillers have also been known to come in and trade large 
blocks of interests with each other at prices much higher than what is being 
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offered to the landowners or other interest owners.
92
 When these horizontal 
drillers trade leases among themselves, it usually consists of more than one 
lease being traded across multiple units. At the pooling hearing, though, 
these multi-unit trades are not allowed.
93
 This excluded evidence leads 
OCC hearings to result in inaccurate fair market valuations. When the 
horizontal producers agree to conceal the values of their trades, this further 
inhibits the OCC’s ability to come up with a truly fair market value.
94
  
One of the first examples of the geographical limitation on leases was 
brought to the OCC in 1976. Fred Coogan and Grady Wallace received a 
pooling application from Arkla Exploration Company regarding a section 
of land (“Section 19”) in Beckham County.
95
 At the hearing for the pooling 
application, there were witnesses who presented testimony to determine the 
costs of drilling this well and, most importantly for our purposes, to 
determine a fair-market value of the lease for the mineral interest from 
Coogan and Wallace. There was testimony that Arkla had acquired leases 
from other owners in Section 19 for $35 per acre with a 1/8 royalty,
96
 and 
that Arkla had acquired leases “covering a large area in two townships in 
this area with the highest bonus being paid being $35 per acre with the 
normal 1/8 royalty.”
97
 Other testimony included vague references to leases 
throughout the top six rows of Figure 1 ranging from $35 to $65 in 1974, 
leases throughout the bottom four rows of Figure 1 going for $25 in the 
1950s, and a reference to a $50 lease in 1975 somewhere “to the west of 
section 19.”
98
 The only references to specific sections, besides Section 19 
(surrounded by a thick box in the bottom row of Figure 1), are indicated in 
Figure 1. There are five distinct sections and their respective prices 
mentioned in the hearing order. The two sections showing $35 and $65 
were leases signed by a farmer, who testified to that at the hearing.
99
 The 
three sections in Figure 1 that show four different leases (two in 9N 24W 
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12) at $100 dollars each were gathered from testimony given by Coogan 


































Using those $100 leases as evidence, Coogan and the other witness 
testified that the fair-market value should be set at $100 per acre with a 3/16 
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 101. The plain image of the plat map with section, township, and range was captured 
from acrevalue.com and the boxes, dates, and values were added by the author of this article 
in OneNote to help visualize the proximity of the sections to each other. 
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 After “taking into account all the facts, circumstances and 
evidence,” the OCC settled on a $35 fair-market value with a 1/8 royalty.
103
 
The order walks through most of the testimony pertaining to fair-market 
value, but not much reasoning can be deduced from it. One thing the OCC 
does mention in its findings is that Coogan, the other witness, and the 
farmer testified to having no knowledge of specific leases in “the 
surrounding sections, with Section 19 being in the center.”
104
 This shows 
that the OCC did not truly consider anything outside of the surrounding 
nine sections, and if they did, they did not give them much weight.  
3. The OCC’s Authority to Exclude Certain Evidence 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that it is within the OCC’s 
delegated powers to make decisions as to what is indicative of value. In 
1981, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said that the OCC has broad discretion 
in determining what is just and reasonable compensation to mineral 
owners.
105
 The Court points to Article 9 Section 20 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, which says that any OCC proceeding appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma will only be reviewed to determine whether the findings 
and conclusions of the OCC are sustained by law and substantial 
evidence.
106
 In other words, the Oklahoma Supreme Court justices are 
supposed to affirm if there is evidence that has substance and relevance that 




The Oklahoma Supreme Court, then, gives a lot of deference to the OCC. 
Even if there is conflicting evidence as to the value of an oil and gas lease, 
the Court is “not privileged to weigh the evidence upon review.”
108
 That 
evidence should be “more than a scintilla; possessing something of 
substance and of relevant consequence carrying with it a fitness to induce 
conviction but remains such that reasonable persons may fairly differ on the 
point of establishing the case.”
109
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Fred Coogan and Grady Wallace were not happy that the OCC gave their 
interests a $35 fair-market value. They were so unhappy that they took the 
OCC to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. They appealed the pooling order, 
arguing that the $35 figure was not the true value of their lease. They 
argued the admissible evidence relating to fair-market value established it 
to be $100.
110
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the OCC’s decision 
was supported by substantial evidence because the $35 leases in Section 19 
introduced as testimony at the hearing were open market transactions.
111
 
The Court took Coogan and Wallace’s argument to be that the OCC was 
wrong in using the $35 leases, and it focused on whether those leases were 
admissible.
112
 The Court never differentiated between the $35 leases and 
the $100 leases as far as admissibility goes.
113
 It mentioned that, at the 
hearing, “the only testimony given . . . to establish fair market value of 
leases . . . is value determined by looking at comparable sales, both in that 
Section and removed from it.”
114
 The Court didn’t exclude the $100 leases 
in that determination, even though they are not in the nine sections 
surrounding Section 19. The Court went on to say that Coogan and 
Wallace’s contention that the prices paid for leases in the area were not 
admissible could not be true because, if it were, “there would be no 
admissible evidence in the record before us as that is the basis upon which 
all the recorded testimony rests.”
115
 This means that all leases, not only the 
nine surrounding Section 19, are admissible. 
Leases held by the state are also unnecessarily excluded from evidence. 
One possible reason why state leases are not considered at hearings is found 
in a 1981 Oklahoma Supreme Court Case. In Miller v. Corporation 
Commission, the appellant challenged the OCC’s award of $75 per acre in a 
lease bonus and a 1/8 royalty. There was a nearby state lease that paid a 
bonus of $101.88 and a royalty of 1/6.
116
 In a 5-4 decision, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held it was permissible for the OCC to exclude evidence of 
a state lease because the statutorily mandated, sealed-bid process for leasing 
state-owned minerals did not represent a sale in the open market.
117
 As 
mentioned before, the fair market value of a pooled interest needs to be at a 
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level where the interest can be bought and sold freely on the open market.
118
 
The four dissenting justices argued state leases should be admissible in a 
pooling hearing because they do, indeed, represent a fair market value.
119
 
The statutorily mandated sealed-bid process leases state-owned land to an 
oil and gas company by requiring bidding parties to send their bid in a 
sealed envelope. No other party knows their bid until the seller opens all 
envelopes at once and takes the highest bid.
120
 It is understandable why this 
might not represent a usual fair market scenario because no one knows what 
anyone else is bidding.  
But as the dissenters argued, this process is designed to allow the state to 
take advantage of all the benefits the open market has to offer.
121
 The 
statute itself even requires the OCC to “provide any other notice of oil and 
gas lease sales to all interested parties by any means it determines is needed 
to attract the best competition.”
122
 Further, the state can reject any or all 
bids that they receive,
123
 which would lend credence to the idea that this is 
an open market strategy. The only time the state will likely reject a bid is 
when it does not believe it is getting fair compensation.  
But most importantly, the majority never explicitly prohibited state 
leases at pooling hearings. The Supreme Court was only concerned with the 
question of whether the OCC could exclude that evidence.
124
 The majority 
emphasized the appellant didn’t argue the sealed-bid price in the lower 
court, and that it didn’t show enough evidence as to why it should be 
indicative of fair market value.
125
 This leaves open the possibility that the 
decision might have come out differently had the appellant argued for using 
the state lease as a basis for the fair market value at the lower court. This 
case cannot be the basis for claiming that state leases are inadmissible at 
pooling hearings. 
Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, the OCC commonly points 
to the Coogan to support its actions.
126
 The OCC notes that the supreme 
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court case says that fair market value is to be determined “by evidence of 
transactions involving similar property in the ‘vicinity’ consummated 
‘within a close time period.’”
127
 There are two key terms that must be 
interpreted here.  
First, the OCC interprets the term “vicinity” using a law review article 
written by a former commissioner of the OCC, Charles Nesbitt.
128
 In that 
article, Nesbitt “expressed his opinion that ‘scant consideration’ is given to 
any transactions outside an area that involved the subject section and its 
eight adjoining sections.”
129
 In other words, limiting the term “vicinity” to 
mean only the 9 surrounding sections is not mandated by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court. The only cases used to vaguely support this contention say 
that distance “should be considered,” and a lease is not sufficiently 
comparable if it is “too distant.”
130
 The opinion of a former commissioner is 
the only thing binding the OCC to follow this practice. Second, the OCC, 
with no authority from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, interprets the phrase 
“within a close period of time” to mean transactions “consummated within 
a year of the hearing.
131
 
Walking through a scenario will help to illustrate why these limits don’t 
always lead to a fair value and why they are hard to reconcile with the 
Supreme Court’s definition of fair market value. Suppose an operator wants 
to acquire two leases so that he can drill an oil well. One lease is owned by 
a vertical producer, the other is owned by a landowner. The operator 
secured the landowner’s lease because the landowner does not know what 
the going rate for oil and gas leases is, so he leased it for $1,000 per acre 
and a 1/8 royalty. The operator then goes to the vertical producer and offers 
the same deal, but the vertical producer rejects it. He rejects it because he 
secured his lease 18 months ago for $5,000 per acre and a 1/5 royalty, a 
much higher value than what he is currently being offered. That vertical 
producer also knows of several other producers in the industry who have 
recently gotten identical deals just a few miles away. He also has suspicions 
that even more lucrative lease deals have been traded between operators in 
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multi-unit trades in the area. But because the only lease allowed as evidence 
in this situation is the $1,000 lease, that’s all that will be considered at a 
forced pooling hearing.  
Though the scenario above follows the OCC’s guidelines, it is difficult to 
reconcile this scenario with the standards for what constitutes a fair market 
value laid out by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Miller. The value to be 
determined at pooling hearings should be “extracted from transactions 
under usual and ordinary circumstances which occurred in a free and open 
market.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court says the sale of an interest, “when 
taken by eminent domain, is the most common example of a sale not made 
in the open market. It is said to be affected by special circumstances which 
do not exist in open market transactions.” The landowners $1,000 is a 
perfect example of a sale “affected by special circumstances which do not 
exist in open market transactions.” In the multi-unit trades, there is 
probably no threat of forced pooling looming in the back of the parties’ 
minds when they are negotiating a deal. Similarly, they probably freely 
discussed and used evidence of trades miles away without worry. Finally, 
because a “pooling order cannot be used as evidence of Fair Market 
Value,”
132
 neither should a negotiation that, if it not had been reached, 
would have been pooled anyway. 
4. Issues Beyond Fair Market Value 
The process of determining a fair value is already questionable, but what 
the OCC then does with that fair value is even worse. The OCC takes that 
fair value and sets an arbitrary bright line cutoff so that anything below its 
idea of a fair market value is worth practically nothing. In most situations, 
the value of a lease’s cash bonus tapers down depending on how much 
working interest is involved. For example, take an order from 2020. The 
OCC gives the parties being pooled different cash bonus options to accept. 
These values are $4,000 for 7/8 working interest, $3,250 for a 13/16 
working interest, $3,000 for 4/5, and $1,500 for 3/4.
133
 If an owner comes 
in with anything less than seventy-five percent working interest, they can 
either participate or “accept the total sum of $1.00 per net mineral acre in 
full consideration of their entire interest in the unit.”
134
 For mineral owners 
who currently have 100% of their mineral rights, this might not be a big 
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deal because they can simply offer seventy-five percent or more. But for an 
independent producer who has already secured a lease with anything less 
than seventy-five percent working interest, there is simply nothing they can 
do. For a deal involving a 160-acre mineral interest, a producer offering a 
seventy-five percent working interest will receive a cash bonus of 
$240,000, while a producer offering 74.9% will receive $160 in exchange 
for their entire interest in the unit.  
The OCC determines that cutoff for working interest percentage on a 
case-by-case basis. This depends on other “fair market” leases that are 
allowed in as evidence on any given pooling application. Another example 
from 2020 shows just that.
135
 In that order, the parties being pooled could 
accept a bonus of $200 per acre, plus they could retain a royalty of 1/16 
(6.25%) in exchange for 13/16 working interest.
136
 Their second option, 
besides participation, was to accept no cash bonus, but retain a 7.5% royalty 
for themselves in exchange for 4/5 working interest. But if they had 
anything less than an 80% working interest to offer could only receive a $1 
per acre cash bonus with no royalty at all.  
Again, it is easy to see how unfair this bright line cutoff is. There is no 
way for a vertical producer to know what the bright line rule might be when 
they are initially negotiating for a lease with the intention of drilling it 
themselves. A small independent producer might make it a habit of making 
deals where they get 75% working interest and the original owner retains 
25%. If they get pooled and the OCC sets that bright line “market value” 
cutoff at 80%, the vertical producer has absolutely no negotiating power 
and they must accept the $1 nominal value because they only have 75% to 
work with. They cannot retroactively go back and change the original 
terms. With the 80% cutoff scheme mentioned above, 81.25% (13/16) 
working interest will give someone on a 160-acre mineral interest a bonus 
of $32,000 plus a royalty interest so that they continue to be compensated 
with a percentage of the proceeds of production. But if they have a 79.9% 
interest to offer, by no fault of their own, but simply because that is all they 
have to work with, they are left with $160 compensation, no royalty. This is 
all because they could not offer at or above the cutoff value determined by 
the OCC. 
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The OCC says that any interest below this bright line level is “burdened 
beyond fair market value.”
137
 To briefly review, consider a case where the 
OCC puts a price tag of a $4,000 per acre bonus on an 87.5% (7/8) working 
interest, $3,250 for 81.25% (13/16), $3,000 for 80%, $1,500 for 75%, and 
$1 for 74.9% and below. If this pricing scheme is analyzed in light of 
Oklahoma’s own definition of “fair market value,” the flaws are hard to 
miss. The Oklahoma Supreme Court defines the fair market value as “the 
level at which this interest can be sold, on open-market negotiations, by an 
owner willing, but not obliged, to sell to a buyer willing, but not obliged, to 
buy.”
138
 Going back to the car example from the Introduction, no one would 
knock down the value of a car from $40,000 to $200 because the car is one 
mile over a certain threshold on the odometer. It is equally hard to imagine 
any scenario where an owner is willing to sell a 75% working interest in a 
160 acre for $240,000, and at the same time, be just as willing to sell a 
74.9% working interest in that same 160 acres for $160.  
IV. Be More Like Texas 
A. These Changes Will Not Compromise Oklahoma’s Legislative Intent 
Oklahoma and Texas have two different goals when it comes to forced 
pooling. Texas wants to encourage voluntary pooling plain and simple, and 
Oklahoma wants to protect correlative rights, prevent drilling of 
unnecessary wells, and promote oil and gas production.
139
 But these two 
policy concerns can work in tandem. It is unlikely that producers will shut 
down operation just because they can’t force pool as easily as they once 
could. Producers are still going to produce oil and gas. Creating a more 
free-market approach to pooling interests would help transfer some of the 
wealth being accumulated back to the pockets of landowners and small 
vertical producers.
140
 This furthers Oklahoma’s intent to protect correlative 
rights, ensuring that no landowner can be forced to pool without a fair and 
reasonable offer being made. Oklahoma should not be so desperate to 
produce oil and gas that it allows producers to pay non-consenting owners 
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hardly anything. These changes will still allow oil and gas to be produced. 
It’s not like a non-consenting owner can say no and prevent exploration. 
They still cannot turn down an offer that is genuinely “fair and reasonable.”  
B. Fair Market Value Must Be Addressed 
The biggest change that needs to be made is the enforcement of showing 
a bona fide effort to reach an agreement. Without this change, it won’t 
matter if Oklahoma keeps the options-given approach or adopts a risk-
penalty approach. If a pooling order continues to be this easy and 
automatic, the end result will be inevitable. The OCC must enforce the bona 
fide effort requirement and make parties show that efforts have been made 
to reach a fair deal.  
Part of showing a bona fide effort to reach a fair deal means that the 
OCC also needs to get a better grasp on what a fair deal looks like. A 
stronger enforcement of showing a bona fide effort will not make a 
difference if the applicants just have to show that an offer was made. It 
needs to be a fair and reasonable offer. In Texas, the offer must take into 
consideration all the relevant facts that existed at the time of the offer and 
that “would be considered important by a reasonable person in entering into 
a voluntary agreement concerning oil and gas properties.”
141
 Surely, state 
leases, Indian leases, leases outside the surrounding nine sections, and 
leases that have been traded between big oil production companies would 
be information that a reasonable person would find important if they were 
negotiating a voluntary pooling agreement. 
Once Oklahoma has a better idea of what fair values look like, then 
enforcement of the bona fide effort requirement will start to do its job of 
weeding out pooling applicants who have not given a fair offer. Like Texas, 
Oklahoma will then begin to see more voluntary pooling agreements 
happening. When this happens, then the result of a forced pooling will start 
to make a difference in the decisions being made by parties both applying, 
and subject to, a forced pooling order. If non-consenting owners know that 
there is a risk-penalty waiting for them if they choose not to accept a fair 
and reasonable offer, they might think twice about turning that offer down. 
Similarly, the non-consenting owners would not have to worry about a 
potential unfair deal being given to them under Oklahoma’s current 
options-given approach if Oklahoma would ensure that the applicant first 
makes a fair and reasonable offer on their own. But of course, this is a bit 
contradictory because the fair value determined in the bona fide effort to 
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reach an agreement would ideally be the same as one handed down at the 
pooling hearing. Therefore, the best approach would be for Oklahoma to 
enforce its bona-fide requirement, expand its valuation method to better 
resemble open-market negotiations, and then add a risk-penalty approach to 
the back end of the process.  
Currently, because big oil companies know that at a pooling hearing they 
will likely have to pay an owner an amount that does not reflect the true 
market value, they are much more inclined to file a pooling application, 
rather than negotiate with owners. Taken together, not having to do any 
work to show a bona fide effort was made to reach an agreement and 
knowledge that they will get a better deal through a pooling order, there is 
no incentive for big oil companies to do anything but file pooling 
applications. But with these changes in place, the incentive for applicants to 
voluntarily pool comes from the strict enforcement of the bona fide effort 
requirement, and the incentive for non-consenting owners comes from the 
risk-penalty approach. Taken together, this is the best way to encourage as 
much voluntary pooling as possible.  
V. The Path Forward 
If there is going to be a change in the way that forced pooling is handled 
in Oklahoma, the OCC is going to have to make it happen. In this final 
section, I will begin first with a discussion on why the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court is not a realistic option. Second, I will discuss how legislative action 
can help efforts to change forced pooling but ultimately will not be enough 
by itself. Finally, I will end by showing why the OCC has the last say on 
any changes to be made in this area of law.  
A. Court Is Not a Realistic Option 
With the great discretion the OCC is afforded, a heavy burden is put on 
anyone trying to change the way forced pooling operates by way of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court. Then there is the issue of finding someone with 
the time and resources to see litigation through. In most scenarios it is better 
for an independent vertical producer to accept the pooling order and take 
the unfair deal now. Trying to litigate, on the other hand, could tie up the 
independent producer’s resources for the foreseeable future, depending on 
how long litigation lasts. There is also no guarantee that litigation will be 
successful. One reason, among others, is that the big horizontal drilling 
companies on the other side of litigation could drag things out indefinitely, 
as they would probably try to just wait until the small producer runs out of 
money. Even if litigation were to ever come to an end, there is no reason for 
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a small producer to hold out hope considering the deference the OCC has 
been given.  
When balancing those factors, a small producer likely will not put their 
livelihood on the line and will continue to operate knowing the truths of 
forced pooling are just an inevitable part of the industry that they will have 
to deal with. But hoping to avoid forced pooling, like a farmer hopes to 
avoid a drought, should not be the end of this discussion. Forced pooling 
can be fixed, even if that means turning to the legislature.  
B. Legislative Changes Alone Are Not Enough 
There are three legislative changes that can be made to § 87.1 that could 
have a large impact on the number of pooling applications that get through 
the door. First, modify the statute to make pooling orders effective for only 
the initial well, rather than the entire spacing unit. Second, change the 
requirement from separate land “or” separate interests to separate land 
“and” separate interests. And third, change Oklahoma’s options-given 
approach to a risk-penalty approach. 
First, the statute currently says that, where owners have not agreed to 
pool and where one owner has drilled or proposes to drill a well, the 
Commission shall “require such owners to pool and develop their lands in 
the spacing unit as a unit.”
142
 Changing the phrase “in the spacing unit as a 
unit,” to “in the well,” would fix this issue. If the pooling order only applied 
to one well, then the issue of the non-consenting owners having to take a 
gamble at the outset would be fixed.
143
 If the well turns out to be successful, 
it would be fair to have the owners who were pooled to be able to opt in 
after seeing the success. There could be some sort of penalty or buy in 
required as well so that they don’t simply get to avoid the entire risk of the 
initial well, but instead have to compensate the owners who did take that 
risk before they are allowed to then participate. But all of this could be 
discussed and incorporated into the risk-penalty approach if it were 
adopted.  
The second change would require that not only there be separate interests 
involved, but also that there be multiple owners of the actual land.
144
 This 
only requires one word to be changed from § 87.1(e). The new statute 
would then eliminate pooling as an option in those scenarios that involve 
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one landowner, but multiple interest owners. The new statute would simply 
read, “When two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced 
within an established spacing unit, and where there are undivided interests 
separately owned . . .” the Commission shall pool their interests.  
The last big change that can come from legislation is the change from an 
options-given approach to a risk-penalty approach. As I discussed earlier,
145
 
this will incentivize non-consenting owners to come to a voluntary 
agreement rather than waiting out a pooling order to see the options they 
might get. But this risk-penalty approach only works if the OCC does its 
part by ensuring a more realistic fair-value is determined. Without the 
OCC’s help, this last change would likely only make things worse, leading 
to automatic pooling and automatic penalties.  
C. Nothing Changes Unless “Industry Custom and Practice in the 
Profession” Changes 
The easiest and most realistic way for forced pooling to change in 
Oklahoma is for the OCC to make it happen. This requires nothing more 
than a revision of the way that things are currently done, but that is much 
easier said than done. There are no binding standards as to why certain 
evidence can or cannot be excluded, even though the OCC uses Oklahoma 
Supreme Court cases to justify some of their practices, as I mentioned 
earlier.
146
 But overall, the discretion given to the OCC by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court will allow these changes to be made. 
If these new methods of valuation are challenged at the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, they will likely fail because of the deference given to the 
OCC. Even if there is conflicting evidence as to the value of an oil and gas 
lease—as there surely will be by any party who challenges the OCC in 
court—the Oklahoma Supreme Court is “not privileged to weigh the 
evidence upon review.”
147
 Any OCC order will only be reviewed to 
determine whether the findings and conclusions of the OCC are sustained 
by law and substantial evidence.
148
 If the OCC were to find a fair market 
value using leases outside the surrounding nine sections, state leases, multi-
unit trades, or leases older than a year, it would be hard to find that these 
leases were not indicative of fair market value. As long as they were 
negotiated between a willing buyer and a willing seller. And of course, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court will affirm if there is evidence that has substance 
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and relevance that could lead the OCC to rule the way they did, even if 
reasonable minds could differ.
149
  
Possibly the greatest hurdle to overcome is the OCC’s reliance on its 
own custom and traditions. An Oklahoma Civil Court of Appeals case 
permitted the OCC to limit evidentiary leases geographically, and in time, 
because these practices were “customary industry custom and practice in 
the profession.”
150
 The case addressed both the limit on the size of the area 
to be reviewed, and the time frame on leases to be considered when making 
a fair value determination.
151
 The OCC regularly uses this case as support 
for limiting leases at hearing.
152
 As I have already shown, there is no 
binding authority forcing the OCC to adhere to these methods of valuation 
when it comes to the geographic area to be considered, the timeframe, and 
state lease
153




The Civil Appeals case here, though, gives the OCC a way to defend any 
of their practices, specifically the exclusion of certain evidence not within 
the surrounding nine sections and leases older than one year. But the OCC 
can use this rationale to justify the other issues I’ve discussed as well, 
including the practice of valuing lease bonuses at only $1 per acre if they 
fall below the minimum working interest cutoff
155
 and the practice of 
excluding multi-unit
156
 leases. Because these practices have been used for 
so long, any one of them will most certainly be found to fall within the 
“customary industry custom and practice in the profession.”  
Although the OCC is not a court of general jurisdiction, looking to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court criteria for going against precedent can help 
determine if the OCC will go against their standard practices anytime soon 
or not. The Oklahoma Supreme Court says that a substantial departure from 
precedent can only be justified based on an unsatisfactory experience with 
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the application of the precedent.
157
 Including more evidence would be a 
much more appropriate valuation method in light of the Miller court’s 
definition of fair market value. Knowing this and having to enforce the 
current practices of valuation just because that is the way it has been done 
before must be an unsatisfactory experience for someone.  
Finally, administrative agencies are free to change their mind when it 
comes to statutory construction, and the courts are to only review the 
administrative decision, and not the agencies change in construction.
158
 
Similarly, the OCC should be able to change the way they enforce a bona 
fide effort, and they should be able to change the way they value leases, all 
with no flak from the Oklahoma Supreme Court.  
The OCC has the power to change, and it is no secret that they are free 
from any binding Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent. If any change, by 
the OCC’s own effort, were to happen, it would have happened already. 
Because it has gone so long with these same standards, and because it 
continues to rely on the industry custom and practice in the profession, 
there is no sign that anything is going to change unless the OCC is 
provoked from outside influences.  
VI. Conclusion 
Oklahoma needs to re-work its forced pooling scheme so that non-
consenting owners stop getting forced to pool for unfair lease values. The 
biggest change that needs to be made involves stopping the automatic 
nature of forced pooling that currently exists. The OCC can do this by 
enforcing and requiring parties to show a bona fide effort was made to 
reach an agreement prior to the pooling application. For the bona fide effort 
to have any bite, the OCC needs to re-evaluate the way it determines fair 
market value. Only when applicants believe that a true, fair market value 
will be determined at a pooling hearing will they be incentivized to come to 
a voluntary agreement before resorting to forced pooling. Add to that a risk-
penalty approach and non-consenting owners will also be more incentivized 
to come to an agreement and avoid forced pooling. Only then will pooling 
in the oil and gas industry begin to operate like an open market, where lease 
values are determined by “open-market negotiations, by an owner willing, 
but not obliged, to sell to a buyer willing, but not obliged, to buy.”
159
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